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Understanding the Rule Against
Perpetuities in Relation to the
Lawyer's Role-To Construe or
Constructt
DAVID M. BECKER*
This article is about the common law rule against perpetuities
and the confusion that exists with respect to the life in being con-
cept. This article observes that one common and very important
pronouncement about the rule, that the life in being can be any-
one or any group of people, is really a precept for the creation of
interests and not for the interpretation of existing limitations. It
observes further tha because the interpretive function is essen-
tial to comprehensive and effective planning and drafting, this
precept is not enough to create dispositive designs and interests
which both achieve planning objectives and satisfy the common
law rule.
INTRODUCTION
This article is about the rule against perpetuities; it is not about
reform of the common law rule but about the original rule itself,
the prevailing rule in the United States.' It is a rule that is widely
misunderstood by students, practicing lawyers, and judges.2 But
t Copyright © 1982 by David M. Becker.
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College; J.D., 1960, University of Chicago.
1. See 5 R. PowELL, THE LAw oF REAL PROPERTY § 761 (P. Rohan rev. ed.
1982).
2. See, e.g., J. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES Xi (4th ed. 1942) ("few
lawyers... have not at some time... fallen into the net which the Rule spreads
for the unwary... ."); Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67
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it is a rule which must be comprehended and mastered before it
can be applied in jurisdictions in which it still obtains; before it
can be reformed; and, perhaps, even before any revised rule can
be applied in jurisdictions in which it has already been changed.3
This article, then, is an effort towards a clearer understanding of
the common law rule against perpetuities both in concept and in
application.
Lawyers perform many tasks and assume various roles. Al-
though the work they perform cuts across a variety of substantive
areas that can be readily categorized,4 their roles fall into two
general categories: dispute resolution and dispute avoidance.
Sometimes these roles involve tasks that require the interpreta-
tion of documents or writings, and at other times they might in-
volve tasks that require their creation. Lawyers must construe to
HARV. L. REV. 1349 (1954) ("The Rule... is a dangerous instrumentality in the
hands of most members of the bar."). See also Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 592,
364 P.2d 685, 690, 15 CaL Rptr. 821, 826 (1961) (the California Supreme Court found
that an attorney who drafted a dispositive instrument that violated the common
law rule did not fail "to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordi-
nary skill and capacity commonly exercise.")
Finally, consider these comments of Samuel M. Fetters.
Perhaps the Supreme Court of California was correct after all. If it takes
over eight hundred pages to explain a one-sentence, twenty-seven word
rule, and that explanation was written by a legal scholar who devoted a
lifetime of study to it, then maybe the rest of us should not be held ac-
countable for knowing little, if anything about it.... There is no question
that the reports are full of lawyer errors, compounded by judicial blun-
ders, in the field of perpetuities law.
Fetters, The Perpetuities Period in Gross and the Child En Ventre Sa Mere in Rela-
tion to the Determination of Common-Law and Wait-And-See Measuring Lives: A
Minor Heresy Stated and Defended, 62 IowA L. REV. 309, 334-35 (1976). It should be
noted that, despite the difficulties that have existed in mastering the common law
rule by bench and bar alike, Fetters believes that it can be understood with a
proper method of analysis; indeed, it is not something too difficult to grasp. Id. at
311, 335.
3. Obviously, the common law rule against perpetuities must be understood
and satisfied in all situations in which it applies. Similarly, questions that arise
concerning reformation of the common law rule, both as to need and substance,
cannot be resolved adequately without a prior understanding of the common law
rule itself. However, it would appear that comprehension and mastery of the com-
mon lav rule might become unnecessary when reformation occurs and some form
of a wait-and-see test replaces it. Nevertheless, it may be argued that compliance
with the common law rule should not be ignored or dismissed in any jurisdiction-
even those that adopt a wait-and-see test. See infra pp. 754-61.
4. Indeed, estate planning itself may involve several substantive areas. For
example, consider the many areas of law that are involved in planning the estate
of a major stockholder in a family-owned business. A dispositive plan might begin
with rearrangements of ownership made during the estate owner's lifetime. This
might require an understanding and application of the law of corporations, con-
tracts, taxation, and, depending upon the composition of the estate, real property.
Further, it might culminate with dispositive instruments that require an under-
standing and application of the law of trusts, wills, and taxation. Although law
school courses are predominantly organized by single subjects of law, seldom, if
ever, is a transaction restricted to just one substantive area of law.
[VOL. 20: 733, 1983] Rule Against Perpetuities
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
litigate; they must also construe to avoid litigation. Lawyers must
draft to resolve disputes; they must also plan and draft to avoid
them.5 While these roles and tasks have much in common, they
also have much that distinguishes them. Dispute resolution that
reaches the stage of litigation usually occurs within a fixed frame-
work, fixed in terms of events and documents that give rise to the
dispute. Quite differently, dispute avoidance that is accomplished
by planning usually occurs within a framework that needs to be
created or shaped. All too often, one overlooks the fact that these
different roles and tasks demand somewhat different skills and
understanding. This oversight is not unusual when it comes to
understanding the common law rule and the life in being concept.
The common law rule is taught mainly by posing examples and
then explaining answers.6 Although many commentators stress
the relevance of the common law rule to planning and drafting,
and even make specific suggestions towards the creation of valid
interests,7 the general emphasis of most is on learning to construe
fixed limitations and to discern whether violations exist.8 Gener-
ally, this makes sense. Even though the tasks are not the same, if
one can construe and interpret properly, one should be able to
5. For example, lawyers plan and draft wills and trusts to implement an es-
tate owner's dispositive scheme, and, quite obviously, they must do this in a man-
ner that avoids subsequent disputes as to estate ownership. Somewhat
differently, lawyers may draft settlement agreements and prepare instruments of
transfer to facilitate the resolution of existing disputes.
6. For example, the original nutshell on perpetuities, upon which generations
of law students have been weaned, contains propositions about the common law
rule that are each followed by examples with explanations. See Leach, Perpetu-
ities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638 (1938). See also L SIMES, SIMES ON FU-
TURE INTERESTS § 109 (1951); R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 42-
47 (1966); J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAM.y WEALTH TANSACTIONS: WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 980-83 (2d ed. 1978).
7. See, e.g., Sparks, Perpetuities Problems of the General Practitioner, 8 U.
FLA. L. REV. 465 (1955); L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS
§§ 1293-97 (2d ed. 1956 & Supp. 1973); R. Lynn, supra note 6, at 152-53; Leach, supra
note 6, at 669-71; Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HAnv. L. REV. 973,
985-86 (1965). These commentators make suggestions with respect to various po-
tential problem areas such as class gifts, powers of appointment, and age
requirements.
8. See, e.g., S. FETrERs & J. SmirrH, SITMES' CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS
§§ 15.02-15.06 (3d ed. 1971); R. MAuDSLEY, THE MODERN LAW OF PERPETUrnES 42-56
(1979); L. Smms & A. SmrrH, supra note 7, §§ 1222-92; R. LYNN, supra note 6, at 33-
141; Leach, supra note 6, at 640-69. Even though Simes and Smith, Lynn, and
Leach make specific suggestions towards the creation of valid interests, it should
be observed that their discussion of the common law rule is nearly always within
the context of interpreting existing limitiations.
construct a valid limitation as well. If one can understand and ap-
ply the rule correctly within a framework of fixed facts and ex-
isting instruments, one should be able to do so when the task is to
create and shape. However, a special difficulty arises with regard
to the common law rule and the life in being concept. Many pro-
nouncements are made with respect to that concept, usually with-
out specific reference to the lawyer's tasks of interpretation or
creation.9 These pronouncements often occur within the context
of particular examples and the task of interpretation. However,
some of these pronounced principles are readily understandable
only within the context of creation, and become confusing when
applied to the task of interpretation. Pronouncements about the
life in being concept should be carefully explained in terms of the
lawyer's specific role and task. Yet, even when properly ex-
plained, it is not always clear that an understanding of the life in
being concept developed with respect to the creative task of plan-
ning and drafting is sufficient. Such a focus may not furnish or
facilitate the comprehensive mastery of the common law rule
needed to construe limitations correctly. This article illustrates
the confusion engendered when the common law rule is not prop-
erly explained. More specifically, this article will demonstrate
that one common and very important pronouncement about the
life in being concept is really a precept for creation, not for inter-
pretation. It will further demonstrate that this precept and the
understanding it affords for creative planning tasks is not only in-
appropriate to interpretive tasks, but it is also ultimately insuffi-
cient even for planning and drafting.
THE LIFE IN BEING CAN BE ANYONE OR ANY GROUP OF PEOPLE: A
PRECEPT FOR THE CREATION OF VALID INTERESTS
The common law rule against perpetuities provides that:
No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one
years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.10
This often quoted statement is John Chipman Gray's short-hand
9. See, e.g., L. SIMIs, SnMEs ON FUTURE INrEREsTS 370-73 (2d ed. 1951); Leach,
supra note 6, at 640-42. Both Simes and Leach explain the life in being concept
with principles followed by illustrations. Primarily, they seem concerned with rec-
ognizing or determining the validating life in being and, accordingly, they seem
preoccupied with the task of interpretation. Nevertheless, within this same dis-
cussion, they refer to how many lives may be "used" or "selected" to measure the
valid period. Their use of these terms suggests another context, that of creation.
Whichever context they might intend, interpretation or creation, they do not make
the distinction between the two either explicit or clear. To be sure, if they do in-
tend such a distinction, it undoubtedly escapes most students who are attempting
to understand the rule.
10. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUrIES 191 (4th ed. 1942).
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summary of his monumental synthesis of the common law of per-
petuities as it had developed over several centuries. Stated in
this fashion, the common law rule has an appealing simplicity.
Yet beneath this simplicity lies a rule that has bedeviled genera-
tions of law students. Inevitably, they ask. Who is this life in be-
ing by which one determines that an interest is valid? They ask
this question because the identity of the validating life in being is
usually the major concern of students trying to comprehend the
common law rule and apply it to specific examples." Typically,
some guidelines of pronouncements are offered about the validat-
ing life in being. Students are then provided examples and in-
structed to follow along when given the correct answers and
explanations. With experience, they are expected to "catch-on"
and soon be able to solve these problems by simple inspection as
the validating life in being becomes evident.12
The instructive guidelines given to students about the validat-
11. See, e.g., L Snmrs, supra note 9, at 370; J. DUKEIMNIER & S. JOHANSON,
supra note 6, at 981; Allan, Perpetuities: Who Are the Lives in Being?, 81 L.Q. Rev.
106, 106-07 (1965); Note, Understanding the Measuring Life in the Rule Against Per-
petuities, 1974 WASH. UJ.Q. 265. Students have other concerns as well. Beyond
the life in being concept they frequently preoccupy themselves with the applica-
tion of the common law rule to class gifts, powers of appointment, options, charita-
ble gifts, revocable trusts, rights of entry, and possibilities of reverter, and also
with the assumed possibilities that the rule requires. Each of these areas of con-
cern is discussed adequately in articles and treatises, especially in the classic
treatment of the rule by Leach, supra note 6. Although students may scoff at the
presumption of fertility that the rule indulges and at the cases of the "unborn
widow" or the "administration contingency," they have little difficulty grasping
them and integrating them into their understanding and application of the com-
mon law rule.
12. See Allan, supra note 11, at 106-07. Allan reduces the mechanics of the
common law rule to a formula and also stresses that the validating life in being is
always mentioned in the limitation, expressly or impliedly. He also adds that
some examples would soon clarify the life in being and the proof required by the
rule. See also R. MAUDSLEY, supra note 8, at 4-5, 94-101. Maudsley contends that
the only lives in being recognized under the common law rule were those that ac-
tually validate an interest, and that these lives always select themselves. See also
Fetters, supra note 2, at 309-11, 334-35; S. FETrRs & J. SMrrH, supra note 8, at 640-
42. Fetters acknowledges that the common law rule has been taught and under-
stood in such a manner that perpetuities problems are solved largely by simple
inspection. However, hedecries this practice. Fetters maintains that a method of
analysis is required, which he develops and explains. Perhaps it is possible to re-
duce application of the common law rule to a precise methodology. Nevertheless,
one might observe that the legal method itself is, in the main, taught experien-
tially and without equations that lead directly to correct answers and solutions.
For example, a student might ask: "How do I discover the issue?" The instructor
might respond "Follow along while we read cases, ask questions, discuss them;
you'll understand in time."
ing life in being usually include: the life in being can be anyone
or any group of people, not unreasonably large or unreasonably
difficult to trace; the person need not be the recipient of any inter-
est within the limitation or within the dispositive instrument it-
self; and the life in being need not be explicitly mentioned in the
dispositive instrument.' 3 Typically, students find these guidelines
confusing when asked to construe and interpret a given limitation
and to determine its validity. Frequently they respond: If the life
in being can be anyone, even someone not mentioned in the in-
strument, then why isn't the life in being anyone who was actu-
ally alive and why can't anyone be used to validate the interest?
Although the answers to these questions seem obvious to those
who have mastered the common law rule, they are neither appar-
ent nor easily understood by most students.' 4
This particular difficulty with the life in being concept, concern-
ing the pronouncement about the validating life being anyone or
any group of people, can be illustrated. Consider this devise by A
of Blackacre: "To B in fee simple; however, if Blackacre is ever
used for the manufacture or distribution of alcoholic beverages,
then to C in fee simple absolute." Ostensibly, A has created a de-
feasible fee simple in B subject to an executory interest in fee
simple absolute in C. Does C's contingent interest violate the
common law rule against perpetuities? In making this determina-
tion, an initial concern of students is with the identity of the life
13. The rule simply is that any living person or persons may be the life or
lives in being for the purposes of any limitation; provided only that if the
settlor or testator expressly selects the life in being for the purposes of a
limitation, he must not select so many nor such unrecognisable persons as
the lives in being that it is impracticable upon evidence available to the
court to ascertain the date of the death of the last one.
R. MAUDSLEY, supra note 8, at 42. Maudsley later qualifies this broad statement by
indicating that the only lives of any use are those in which vesting cannot possibly
occur beyond twenty-one years of their deaths. Id. at 43. Nevertheless, it typifies
the kind of broad and unqualified statement that students seize upon in their at-
tempt to understand and apply the common law rule. See also 6 AMERiCAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 24.13 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); Leach, supra note 6, at 641-42. Cf. I.
LYNN, supra note 6, at 43.
14. The answer to these questions is in two parts. First, these guidelines are
misleading. They are primarily precepts for the creation of valid interests. Virtu-
ally anyone or any group of people can be used to create a valid interest under the
common law rule. However, this statement does not apply to interests already
created which must then be tested in terms of the rule. These pronouncements
are really precepts for creation and not interpretation, and a student has good rea-
son to be confused if he is attempting to apply them to an existing limitation for
the purpose of determining its validity. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
Second, because the common law rule is a possibilities test, it is absolutely clear
to those that understand the rule that, when it comes to interpretative application,
the validating life in being cannot be anyone and that the proof required by the
common law rule immediately limits the potential pool of lives in being that might
be used to validate. See infra note 16.
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in being by which the period of the common law rule must be
measured. Can the validating life in being be anyone at all, even
someone not mentioned in this limitation? The answer to this
question is no. The usual explanation might begin with the obser-
vation that the common law rule is a possibilities test. An inter-
est is valid if there is no possibility that it might vest beyond the
period of the rule' 5-a life in being plus twenty-one years. An in-
terest is valid if it must vest, if at all, within twenty-one years of
its creation. If this cannot be proven, then the interest is valid
only if one can identify some person in being when the interest is
created and prove that there is no possibility whatsoever that the
interest can vest beyond twenty-one years of that person's death.
Neither of these proofs can be made in this instance, and, as writ-
ten, the executory devise given to C violates the common law
rule. Students frequently wonder- What about B and C; are they
validating lives in being? And so the explanation would continue.
C's interest is contingent, but it is also transmissible at C's death.
By its terms, it will vest in C, or C's successors, whenever the re-
quirement as to land use is breached. The condition itself ex-
tends beyond both the lives of B and C; it can endure indefinitely
just the same as the interests in fee simple given to them. One
cannot prove that the executory interest must vest or fail within
twenty-one years of its creation, nor can one prove that it must
vest or fail within twenty-one years of either B's or C's death.
The condition can be violated generations beyond their deaths.
The defeasible fee simple in B's successors would then be
divested in favor of C's successors, none of whom were in being
15. This statement of the common law rule differs in form from the test offered
by Gray, and used by most exponents of the rule. See supra text accompanying
note 10. Nevertheless, this different form is used at various points within this arti-
cle to avoid a mistake commonly made even by experts. Gray's test is that an in-
terest is valid if it must vest, if at all, within the allowed time period.
Unfortunately, most commentaries on the rule overlook at one point or another
the "if at all" requirement in their descriptions of the test. "The proper question
to ask is: Can I point to some person or persons now living and say that this inter-
est will by the very terms of its creation be vested in an identified individual
within twenty-one years after that person dies?" Sparks, supra note 7, at 470. This
oversight is critical because, without the "if at all" requirement, one could never
prove that a contingent interest must vest within any period and, therefore, all
contingent interests would violate the rule. By definition, a contingent interest is
not certain to vest. See J. DUKEMINER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 6, at 980-82. The
common law rule does not require that an interest must become possessory within
the allowed time period, nor does it require that it must vest within such period.
It does, however, forbid all interests that might possibly vest beyond twenty-one
years after the deaths of all lives in being at the creation of such interest.
at A's death. Therefore, B and C are not lives by which the exec-
utory interest can be validated. The same can be said about any
life in being extraneous to the devise itself. For example, what
about the President of the United States who is in being at A's
death? Once again, the condition can last indefinitely and it is to-
tally unrelated to the President's life. The condition as to land
use can be breached generations beyond his death. One cannot
prove that the executory interest must vest or fail within twenty-
one years of his death. The President is not a life by which the
interest can be validated. If a validating life in being is to be
found, it must necessarily be someone whose life plays a part in
either the timing of the condition or the fulfillment or breach of
the condition.16 No such person can be found with respect to this
16. For many who understand the common law rule, this conclusion is too ob-
vious to require any discussion. Nevertheless, it requires careful attention and ex-
planation. To begin with, the rule requires a proof that there is no possibility
whatsoever that vesting can occur beyond twenty-one years of the death of some
life in being. If a proof is to be made and all possibilities eliminated, simple logic
dictates that this can only be accomplished with someone connected to the issue of
vesting. It is impossible to make the required proof with respect to anyone totally
unconnected to vesting; therefore, these unconnected lives must be irrelevant to
application of the rule. All agree that potentially the required proof can only be
made with someone within a cluster of connected lives in being. However, all do
not agree as to how this cluster should be defined or refined.
This matter of precise definition becomes especially important under wait-and-
see reformations of the common law rule. Once the rule becomes a test of actuali-
ties, not possibilities, and once it requires that determinations of validity be
delayed for a period of time, the precise contours of this period of time become
absolutely essential to the application of the new rule. For most commentators
and legislatures, neither everyone alive nor only those that validate under the
common law rule makes sense as the new waiting period lives. The former does
too much by way of reformation, while the latter does nothing at all. For many,
however, a compromise waiting period exists. This compromise period can be
forged with the cluster of connected lives from which a proof might be made, and
a validating life discovered, under the common law rule. The lives that fall within
this cluster of connected lives have been referred to as "limiting lives," "relevant
lives," or "causal lives." Beyond the obvious need for some connection to vesting,
disagreement has developed as to how these lives are defined and precisely who
they are. Stated differently, exactly what kind of connection is required?
Some have defined "causal lives" as those who restrict the vesting period. This
seems clear enough; nevertheless, there are problems. For example, consider this
devise by A: "To W for life, and then, thirty years after his death, to Z in fee sim-
ple if then living." Assume that both W and Z survive A. The devise to Z is con-
tingent and the contingency is one that must be fulfilled more than twenty-one
years after W's death. Therefore, W is not a validating life in being. Nevertheless,
this devise is valid because it must vest, or fail, within Z's own lifetime. There-
fore, Z is a validating life in being under the common law rule. Accordingly, Z
should be comprehended by any precise definition of the cluster of connected
lives that can be used to make a proof under the common law or determine the
waiting period under a wait-and-see statute. But, is Z a "causal life" under this
definition? What exactly does it mean to say that "causal lives" are only those
lives that limit or restrict the time of vesting? With this definition, it would seem
that only W qualifies as a "causal life" because the vesting period is directly mea-
sured from the time of his death. However, W is not a validating life in being. Be-
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limitation. Indeed, C's interest fails because there is no validating
life in being. Invariably, this latter statement confounds students.
They might ask. If the life in being can be anyone or any group of
people, why is it that in this example there is no life in being at
all; indeed, doesn't there always have to be some life in being?
This entire explanation is seldom clear to students initially trying
to cope with the common law rule. The interpretive task-apply-
ing the common law rule to a given limitation-is not easily
accomplished.
Quite differently, students can readily grasp and apply this
same pronouncement when asked to construct or create a limita-
tion that does not violate the common law rule. With little diffi-
culty, they understand that the validating lives in being can be
literally any reasonable number of people, even those not pro-
vided for in the limitation, if the draftsman explicitly requires
that vesting must occur, if at all, by the time these people die or
within twenty-one years after their deaths. Even if somewhat un-
clear as to why C's executory interest violates the common law
rule, students usually can rewrite the limitation and make C's in-
terest valid. For example, they seldom have difficulty in curing
the violation by relating the condition of divestment to the life of
B or C, or both. This can be accomplished by either of these
revisions:
(H)owever, if Blackacre is ever used during the life of B or within twenty-
one years after his death (is ever used during the life of C or within
twenty-one years after his death) (is ever used during the life of the survi-
vor of B and C or within twenty-one years after the survivor's death)
for... 17
cause Z is a validating life, it would seem that this definition of "causal life" is too
restrictive. Further, in the illustration under consideration in the text, is either B
or C a "causal life" in being? Does either B's or C's life restrict the vesting period?
Unlike Z, neither B nor C is a validating life in being, but do they belong initially
within the cluster of connected lives with which a common law proof might be at-
tempted or a waiting period determined? Should "connected or causal lives" be
defined or elaborated so as to include them? For a discussion of these matters
and, particularly, the problem of "causal lives" at common law and under wait-
and-see rules, see R. MAunsLEY, supra note 8, at 87-109; Morris and Wade, Perpetu-
ities Reform at Last, 80 LQ. Rev. 486, 495-501 (1964); Allan, supra note 11, at 106;
Note, supra note 11, at 265; Note, Measuring Lives Under Wait-And-See Vesions of
the Rule Against Perpetuities, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 577 (1982).
17. None of these variations violates the common law rule. In the first varia-
tion, B's interest cannot be divested beyond twenty-one years of the death of a life
in being-B; if the condition is not breached within that period of time, B's inter-
est becomes absolute in his successors. In the second variation, B's interest can-
not be divested beyond twenty-one years of the death of a life in being--C; if the
Alternatively, students may readily observe that by using spe-
cially selected lives that are extraneous to the particular gifts, the
probable period of years in which the condition operates can be
extended even further. For example, consider this revision:
"(H) owever, if Blackacre is ever used during the life of the survi-
vor of B, C, M, N, or 0 or within twenty-one years after the survi-
vor's death for. . ." Assuming that M, N, and 0 are three healthy
babies born just before A executes his will, the period of the con-
dition is, in all probability, extended several decades. Nonethe-
less, C's interest is valid.18
In summary, students find this particular guideline-that a vali-
dating life in being can be anyone or any group of people-mis-
leading. In reality, the life in being by which an interest is
validated cannot be anyone at all with respect to specific interests
already created. Once the terms of a limitation have been cast,
the lives in being that can potentially validate an interest are
fixed. They cannot be anyone at all, and students find it terribly
confusing to be told otherwise when they attempt to determine
who these lives are. Although this guideline is usually announced
within the context of the common law rule as applied to existing
limitations,19 it is not really a useful principle for this interpretive
task. Instead, it is a precept for the constructon and creation of
interests. 20 Indeed, it is inaccurate to say that the validating life
in being can be anyone or any group of people. However, it is
quite accurate to say that a planner can select virtually anyone as
the life in being needed to create a valid interest. This pro-
condition is not breached within that period of time, B's interest becomes absolute
in B or his successors. In the third variation, B's interest cannot be divested be-
yond twenty-one years of the death of the survivor of two lives in being-B and C;
if the condition is not breached within that time period, B's interest becomes abso-
lute in his successors.
18. Undoubtedly, the period of the condition is extended considerably because
of the probability that at least one of the specially selected lives, each of whom is
necessarily younger than B and C, will live longer than both B and C. Neverthe-
less, this revision does not violate the common law rule. Presumably, this group of
validating lives in being is not unreasonably large or unreasonably difficult to
trace for purposes of determining the time of their respective deaths. See L. SMIEs
& A. Sbr, supra note 7, § 1223, at 108-12. Therefore, B's interest cannot be
divested beyond twenty-one years of the death of the survivor of five acceptable
lives in being--B, C, M, N, and 0. If the condition is not breached within that pe-
riod of time, B's interest becomes absolute in his successors.
19. Usually this particular guideline is explained with illustrations that sug-
gest application of the common law rule within a context of interpretation.
Whatever might actually be intended, these explanations seldom clearly differenti-
ate between the tasks of interpretation and creation. See supra note 9. See also L.
Snits & A. Smrr, supra note 7, § 1223, at 108-12.
20. This conclusion is not novel. See, e.g., R. LYu, supra note 6, at 43. Surely
it is recognized by anyone who has ever mastered the common law rule. Never-
theless, it is a critical observation that is frequently overlooked or
underemphasized.
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nouncement about the life in being makes little sense when con-
struing an existing limitation, but it is easily understood and
applied when constructing or conceiving a limitation.2 1
APPLYING THE COMMON LAw RULE IN PRACTICE
This Pronouncement About the Life in Being is Not Enough
Either to Construe or Construct
It would seem, then, that students and lawyers should have lit-
tle difficulty satisfying the common law rule with respect to crea-
tive tasks; for example, planning for the disposition of estates and
drafting instruments that fulfil such plans. This creative function
is the most important one in the estate transfer process because
21. Two important observations should be made at this point. First, this pro-
nouncement about the life in being-that the validating life in being can be any-
one or any group of people-is fundamentally a precept for the construction and
creation of interests. Nevertheless, there is one narrow situation in which it is rel-
evant to the interpretation of existing limitations. It is relevant to limitations
which already use a group of people to govern the time of vesting. This group of
people must not be unreasonably large or difficult to trace. See supra note 13. Ac-
cordingly, in determining whether the common law rule has been violated, one
must make an interpretive assessment as to whether vesting can occur more than
twenty-one years beyond the last of this group to die; and whether this group is
unreasonably large or difficult to trace. Second, problems that students have with
the interpretive use of the common law rule do not disappear even after they un-
derstand that the validating life in being cannot be anyone when applying the rule
to existing limitations. For example, whenever an interest violates the common
law rule there is no validating life in being; there is no life in being about whom
one can say that the interest must vest, or fail, within twenty-one years of his
death. Nevertheless, students persist in asking: In finding the interest invalid,
who is the measuring life-who is the life in being? See supra text accompanying
note 16. Their confusion is very real, and it is also very understandable. Some
commentators have said that the only lives in being that matter under the com-
mon law rule are those that validate, and that these lives always select them-
selves. See, e.g., R. MAuDSLEY, supra note 8, at 87-100. Telling students that there
are no lives in being other than those that validate ignores their problem of com-
prehension. They may understand that interests which violate the rule are with-
out validating lives, but they do not understand how this conclusion of invalidity is
reached. The presence or absence of validating lives is not self-evident to the nov-
ice. Students search for a process by which they can make their own determina-
tions. To do this, they see a need to establish a pool of lives by which they can
test the limitation. For them, there must always be some lives in being-a group
of lives by which they can test and apply the rule. Accordingly, they always want
to establish, even when there is in fact no validating life, a pool of lives which they
can use to confirm their conclusions. It would seem, then, that the guidance they
seek and require is as to the composition of this pool of lives by which they can
test the limitation. Indeed, it is irrelevant whether these testing lives have been a
formal part of the common law rule; inevitably, they are a part of the process of
applying it.
it sets the framework by which dispositive goals are to be
achieved, assets are to be conserved, and disputes are to be
avoided. Consequently, it is here that lawyers first and most fre-
quently encounter the common law rule, and it is here that stu-
dents must master it. One might wonder. why is there so much
concern with the life in being concept? It is a concept readily
mastered and applied within the context most important to the
practice. And if this is true, why does the common law rule re-
main such a mystery to most students and lawyers? Further, one
might wonder why is the interpretive task emphasized so much in
teaching the common law rule when this seems least important?
There are three answers to these questions, two that are obvi-
ous and a third that is not. First, something can always be said
about the importance of learning a whole rule and not just a por-
tion of it. Something seems inherently wrong in concluding that
lawyers need not master the entire fabric of the common law rule
either because of its complexity or because of its comparative dis-
use in certain aspects of the practice. Second, even if the creative
function of planning and drafting is the prevailing context for ap-
plying-and, therefore, understanding-the common law rule,22
lawyers cannot always control the situations in which they en-
counter the rule. In every interpretive dispute there are at least
two sides. Usually one side is represented by lawyers who parti-
cipated in drafting the dispositive instrument; those who first
faced the comon law rule in performing this creative function and
could limit the conditions in accordance with the rule's require-
ments. Yet there is nearly always one side that is new to the in-
strument and that enters the case only at the stage of
interpretation and dispute resolution. Lawyers frequently decline
future interest litigation. It does not behoove the profession for
these interpretive causes to go begging to the few who revel in
the common law rule or to pass by default to those who lack the
integrity or the wisdom to forgo what is beyond them. In short,
something seems radically wrong with predicating the breadth of
one's understanding upon expectations of selective practice and
representation.
Finally as a practical matter, neither lawyers nor their clients
formulate dispositive designs with the common law rule foremost
in mind. This seems both natural and wise. Estate owners do not
22. It should be noted that for some lawyers the framework for understanding
and applying the common law rule may involve primarily the interpretation of ex-
isting dispositive instruments. For example, consider the role of lawyers em-
ployed full time by corporate executors and trustees. Although these lawyers may
conceive and draft will and trust forms for general use, their principal concern is
with the interpretation and administration of instruments prepared by others.
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normally conceive and elaborate future interests and their attend-
ant conditions in terms of the common law rule's constraints. Fu-
ture interests and trusts are used for a variety of reasons. They
are used, for example, to provide intermediate benefits for partic-
ular beneficiaries; to facilitate management and the retention of
the estate generally, or with respect to specific beneficiaries; to
encumber alienability; to assure appropriate division among fam-
ily members or units within the family; and to extend dead hand
control indefinitely.23 These kinds of objectives do not naturally
lend themselves to time limitations upon vesting other than those
needed to fulfill the objective that underlies the use of a particu-
lar future interest. For example, estate owners who wish to defer
control of principal until respective recipients are capable of en-
joying and managing it, naturally think in terms of the criteria
and conditions relevant to those objectives. These future inter-
ests themselves are not ordinarily designed and developed with
the time frame of the common law rule squarely in mind. If time
is a factor at all in determining capacity for enjoyment and man-
agement, the foremost planning consideration should be the time
when particular beneficiaries are most apt to demonstrate these
attributes. This time period may or may not fall within the period
of the common law rule.
Accordingly, most planning and drafting initially requires the
formulation of a design that incorporates those conditions and
time factors that best implement the estate owner's particular dis-
positive goals. If estate owners naturally think first in terms of
23. For example, suppose that A, an estate owner, wanted to make certain that
his estate was first used to meet the needs of his wife and children, and that he
expected the needs of some might be negligible, while the needs of others might
be substantial. Suppose, further, that his estate was sizable and that he was con-
cerned with the ability of some to manage and conserve any immediate distribu-
tions of principal. Finally, assume that because of these concerns with need,
conservation, and management, he wanted to defer ultimate distribution of shares
of principal for a considerable period of time-at least until his wife and children
had died. And with respect to this distribution of principal, assume that he
wanted it to belong to his descendants without regard to family unit. With these
objectives in mind, A's lawyer might then devise a plan that involved a trust and
future interests. More specifically, he might create a testamentary trust that
would provide income, and principal if necessary, to A's wife and children. The
trustee might be given limited discretion with respect to income and principal to
satisfy any special needs of these beneficiaries. And at the deaths of A's wife and
children, the trust might then provide for distribution of principal in equal shares
to living descendants per capita. This kind of dispositive scheme would serve A's
objectives generally. Elaboration of other priorities, such as saving death taxes,
would require an adjustment of these priorities and of the plan itselL
these factors and criteria, it would seem that the same should be
true for the lawyers who plan their estates. Because the rule may
require some moderation of objectives, it should only be consid-
ered after the design which fully accomplishes dispositive goals
has been formulated. Intelligent and effective alteration of the de-
sign, and if necessary its underlying objectives, cannot-and
should not-be done until it is determined which parts of the de-
sign violate the common law rule. This technique requires inter-
pretive use and application of the common law rule and the life in
being concept. Quite obviously, it makes no sense to modify a
dispositive design until it is clear that such modification is
needed. Further, it is just as senseless to attempt rectification
without a firm grasp of the precise problem and reason for the
violation.
In short, although the common law rule and its life in being
concept are easily mastered by a planner and draftsman, the crea-
tive function itself seldom proceeds to a final product without
prior interpretive use and application of this rule. The common
law rule should not emerge as part of the creative planning pro-
cess until after some preliminary design has been sketched. First
it is applied within an interpretive context in which the validating
life in being cannot be anyone; thereafter, when necessary, it is
applied within a creative context in which anyone may be made a
validating life in being.2 4
The Planning Process in Action-An Illustration
These observations can be illustrated. Suppose, after some con-
sultation and counseling,25 it appears that A, an estate owner, has
24. These foregoing observations and conclusions about the planning process
derive from personal conjecture and not empirical study. They are made on the
basis of the logical demands that flow from a given task, indeed, they are general-
izations about what lawyers should be doing when they plan and draft. However,
in actuality, lawyers do not always function in the precise manner described. For
example, sometimes the preliminary design that is sketched involves a standard
form with some modifications. The common law rule is then applied interpre-
tively, with further modifications if necessary. Sometimes, however, these same
lawyers ignore the rule completely because of a saving clause that is included in
the form. This kind of drafting should border on malpractice. At the very least, it
ignores the fact that the saving clause can radically alter a dispositive design in
the event of a perpetuities violation, even though that violation could have been
avoided with only slight alterations in the final design itself. For further discus-
sion, see infra, pp. 754-61.
25. The dispositive priorities and objectives of A, that are described in the text
that follows, do not ordinarily emerge all at once. The attitudes and feelings of cli-
ents about death, family, and property are exceedingly complex; often, it is diffi-
cult for them to identify and express their precise wishes. Lawyers must
recognize that these goals frequently cannot be developed without sensitive coun-
seling by them. Although a client initiates the process and knows that he is there
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developed certain objectives with respect to the disposition of the
bulk of his substantial estate. A's estate consists largely of devel-
oped real property that he believes it would be unwise to sell and
apportion in the immediate future. A is unmarried and has no
descendants. He wants to leave his estate first to his much
younger sister, S, and her family, and then he wants it to belong
to the family of his deceased older brother, B. More specifically,
A first wants his estate used to care for S, and at her death ap-
plied for the benefit of her children. Currently, S has one infant
child, but she plans to have other chldren. After S's children die,
A wants it to pass absolutely to his brother's family. Because B's
children are considerably older than S's child and will be even
older than the children S plans to have, A believes that B's chil-
dren are not likely to survive the deaths of both S and her chil-
dren, existing and anticipated. Accordingly, A prefers that a
direct gift of the principal ultimately be made to B's current and
anticipated grandchildren. Finally, A wants B's grandchildren to
have the principal for themselves only when they are capable of
managing it; he does not want them to dissipate it because of im-
maturity or inexperience. For this reason, he does not want prin-
cipal distributed to them immediately or all at once; instead, he
wants distribution staggered in several payments beginning at
age twenty-five.
With these facts and objectives, a lawyer might typically sketch
out a rough dispositive design that attempts to implement each of
A's goals in consecutive fashion. For example, a planner might
place the bulk of A's estate at his death in trust and provide:
Income to S for life. After she dies, income to her children in equal shares
for the life of the survivor of them. After all of S's children die, the princi-
pal is to be given in equal shares to each of B's grandchildren, with distri-
bution of each grandchild's respective share as follows: one-third at age
twenty-five, one-third at age thirty, and one-third at age thirty-five.
With this rough sketch in mind, A's lawyer can then address
to talk about transfers that involve death, he may be reluctant to discuss matters
that concern his actual death or the deaths of those around him. He may begin
with some embryonic thoughts about his estate design, and it then becomes the
planner's task to expand and develop these thoughts into a viable dispositive
scheme. Lawyers must carefully anticipate these obstacles; they must prepare
themselves for a process that requires delicate questioning and elaboration of
their clients' ideas. For a discussion of these matters, see T. SHAFFER, THE PLAN-
NING AND DRAFTING OF WIis AND TRusTs 1-57 (2d ed. 1979); B. BECKER, PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ASPECTS OF ESTATE PLANNING, ESTATE PLANNING QUARTERLY BOOKLET
No. 403, 1-35 (1970).
specific problems presented by both A's dispositive scheme and
the particular language used to implement it.26 As for the com-
mon law rule, it would have made little sense to tamper with A's
dispositive objectives until they are literally formulated and re-
duced to actual provisions. Indeed, it is exceedingly difficult to
determine whether and why the common law rule requires sche-
matic or language revision until actual interests have been cast
against which the rule can be tested. Although some experts on
estate planning and the common law rule immediately perceive
potential problems with the rule and they can draft initially with
it in mind, most lawyers cannot and should not do this. Perhaps
even the expert should be wary of compromising the explicit
goals of estate owners until it becomes abundantly clear that
these particular goals literally cannot be accomplished. In this in-
stance, A ultimately wants to provide for all of B's grandchildren
after the deaths of S and her children and, further, he wants to
impose an age requirement upon the grandchildren's respective
interests. It is difficult to see how one can readily determine
whether these goals must be moderated until they are trans-
formed into actual interests which may or may not violate the
common law rule. However, once a rough sketch is made, one
should be ready to apply the common law rule, ready to deter-
mine whether there is any violation, and also prepared to deter-
mine the kind of change that should be made to A's dispositive
scheme if a violation exists.
Examining, then, the interests tentatively created by A, no per-
petuities problem arises with either of the life estates created in
S or her children. S's infant child has a vested remainder for life
that is subject to open. Nevertheless, this class gift to her chil-
26. Important questions and problems remain, matters that become more ap-
parent as a result of this rough sketch. For example, should S receive only so
much of the income as is necessary to maintain her? If so, what should be done if
the income exceeds what is needed to maintain her? What if the income is insuffi-
cient to meet those needs? After S's death, what should happen when the first of
her children dies? To whom should that deceased child's share of the income be-
long? The final distribution of principal to B's grandchildren suggests require-
ments of survivorship. See infra notes 29 and 33. More specifically, does A intend
that B's grandchildren must survive the life tenants and the designated ages? Fur-
ther, after the death of the life tenants, but before complete distribution of a
grandchild's share, what should be done with the income generated by the corpus
that remains in trust? The answers to these questions are critical. A's lawyer
must probe further to discover and elaborate A's objectives and to refine his dis-
positive design. These revelations never come all at once. Often preliminary
drafts must be made before a viable plan can be crystallized. For a description
and discussion of this evolutionary process, see D. Becker, Future Interests and the
Myth of the Simple Wilk An Approach to Estate Planning, 1973 WASm U.L.Q. 1, 1-
7; D. Becker, Broad Perspective in the Development of a Flexible Estate Plan, 63
IOWA L REv. 751, 810-15 (1978).
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dren is contingent for purposes of the common law rule until the
class membership is fully determined.27 However, there is no vio-
lation because it will fully vest under the rule when the class
membership is fixed at the time of her death.
As to the class gift given to B's grandchildren, there would
seem to be problems at the outset, which the tentative draft clari-
fies. B's grandchildren-including those currently alive-have a
class gift which is contingent for purposes of the common law rule
because the maximum membership will not be determined until
B's children die or until the time for first distribution, if it occurs
before B's children die.28 It may also be deemed contingent be-
cause of the age requirements and, perhaps, because of an im-
plied requirement that they must survive the life tenants. 29
27. The common law rule imposes special requirements on class gifts. Class
gifts are contingent under the rule until the membership is fully determined.
Stated differently, the common law rule treats class gifts as a unit; if any possible
member's interest violates the rule, then the entire class gift also violates the rule.
And this includes even those class members whose interests must clearly vest, or
fail, within the period of the rule. For a class gift to be valid, the interests of all
eligible members must vest, or fail, within the allowed time period; none can vest
beyond it. See I SudEs & A. SmTH, supra note 7, §§ 1265-1270 at 195-206; I. MAUD-
sLEY, supra note 8, at 39-42. Accordingly, because S is ascertained and her interest
is vested, her life estate does not violate the common law rule. Further, her chil-
dren's life estate does not violate the rule because their class gift will be fully de-
termined by the time of S's death, and she is a life in being. Stated differently, no
possible class member's interest can be ascertained, and therefore vest, beyond
S's death.
28. The gift of principal to B's grandchildren alive at A's death may or may not
be contingent upon their surviving the life tenants and the designated ages; how-
ever, the gift to them is contingent under the common law rule because the class
gift is subject to open until B's children die or until the time for first distribution,
if it occurs before B's children die. See infra note 34.
29. Conceivably, a court might find these conditions and requirements of sur-
vivorship because it believes A must have intended them. See infra note 33. Fur-
ther, a court might reach these same conclusions because of the language used in
the preliminary provision itself. To begin with, principal is not given to B's
grandchildren until the life tenants die, and then it is to be shared by them
equally. Some courts have reasoned that if a gift-particularly a class gift subject
to open-is not made until a future time, then such gift is future in substance and
contingent until that time. And this contingency involves survivorship to the time
at which the gift is made or distributed. This principle is sometimes embodied in
a rule known as the "divide-and-pay-over rule," a rule that does not always require
exact language of divide-and-pay-over. For a discussion of this principle and rule,
see L. S iEs & A. SmrrH, supra note 7, §§ 593, 654-655, 657-658. See also In re
Blake's Estate, 157 Cal. 448, 108 P. 287 (1910); In re Estate of Campbell, 250 Cal.
App. 2d 576, 58 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1967). Therefore, because principal is not given im-
mediately to grandchildren in this preliminary provision, some courts might find
their interest contingent until their gift is made; more specifically, contingent upon
survival of the life tenants. Additionally, courts have found that gifts "at," "when,"
Without a prior sketch, many lawyers who perceive a potential
perpetuities problem might attempt to avoid a violation by paring
down the age requirements, or by eliminating them altogether,
and by making the maximum number of eligible grandchildren
referable to persons alive at A's death. For example, they might
explicitly select S as the validating life and, thereby, limit the
maximum class membership to B's grandchildren born within
twenty-one years of S's death. Nevertheless, this might be un-
necesary. Because B is dead and all of his children are lives in
being,30 no grandchildren can be born beyond B's children's
deaths and, therefore, beyond the period of the common law rule.
The maximum membership is clearly determined within the com-
mon law rule because it is circumscribed by the deaths of lives in
being, lives not explicitly mentioned in the rough sketch. B's chil-
dren, who are neither given an interest nor mentioned in this
rough draft, obviate the need to close the class prematurely. Nev-
ertheless, the tendency of at least some planners and draftsmen
would be to limit maximum class membership with reference to
the deaths of named beneficiaries who are alive at A's death.31
Yet this may be unnecessary. By sketching out a tenative limita-
tion that fully articulates A's dispositive goals and construing and
interpreting it in terms of the common law rule, it becomes appar-
ent that any problems with the rule lie in the age requirement
and any other implied survivorship requirements, and not with
the time32 in which the maximum number of B's grandchildren is
or "if" a specified age is attained, without an interim gift of income to such recipi-
ents, imply a condition of survival until such age. See L SInES & A. Smrr, supra
note 7, §§ 586, 656. Because distribution of principal to B's grandchildren in the
preliminary provision is to occur "at" specified ages, some courts might find these
gifts contingent upon survivorship of these respective ages.
30. This assertion must be qualified. It assumes that all of B's children will
survive A and become lives in being at A's death. Obviously, a planner cannot
know that B's children will actually survive A and, therefore, he cannot make this
assumption when the dispositive instrument is drafted and executed. Neverthe-
less, because B is dead he does know that B's children cannot increase in number
after the death of A--that the procreators of the class of grandchildren who ulti-
mately take cannot consist of lives born after the instrument becomes effective.
Therefore, a planner can properly assume that the maximum number of grandchil-
dren will be fixed at A's death-assuming all of B's children predecease A--or will
be determined no later than the deaths of lives in being at A's death-assuming
one or more of B's grandchildren survive A.
31. For example, a planner might limit class membership to those grandchil-
dren born within twenty-one years of the later of the deaths of S and her children
who are alive at A's death. For another illustration of this technique, see infra
note 36 and accompanying text. Also, compare the similar technique used in sav-
ig clauses. See infra notes 39 and 51.
32. To be sure, the maximum number of B's grandchildren must necessarily
be determined within the period of the common law rule. And, without more, it
can be said that no problems under the rule exist with respect to this determina-
tion. However, if a requirement is imposed that grandchildren must survive either
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fixed.
With respect to these age and implied survivorship requike-
ments, A has said that he wants to delay distribution of principal
until B's grandchildren can enjoy and manage it- accordingly, he
wants distribution to them staggered, beginning at age twenty-
five. Both A's direction and the specific language of the tentative
provision suggest a possible survivorship requirement, namely,
that each particular distribution of principal depends upon a
grandchild actually attaining the designated age. They also imply
an additional survivorship requirement quite apart from age, that
is, that distribution of principal should be made to only those
grandchildren who survive S and her children.33 These possible
survivorship requirements are the major sources of a potential
perpetuities violation.
Indeed, either of these survivorship requirements will, without
more, cause a violation of the common law rule. For example, if
principal is limited to B's grandchildren alive when all prior inter-
ests terminate, the common law rule is violated because the gift
may vest in a group who might not be lives in being at a time that
might be beyond the period permitted by the rule. Once again,
the common law rule requires that all possibilities be considered.
B's children may have additional children after A's death, and
they may become the only grandchildren thereafter to survive
and qualify for principal. S may also have additional children af-
ter A's death, and they may outlive all who were in being at A's
death by more than twenty-one years. Because the gift of princi-
the life tenants or the designated ages, it can be said that a problem exists with
respect to the determination of the maximum number of B's grandchildren eligi-
ble to take. Or at least it can be said that a violation of the common law rule can
be averted by closing the class of grandchildren to further members much ear-
lier-immediately at A's death. If the determination of the maximum number of
B's grandchildren is altered in this fashion, there would be no violation because
the gift to all grandchildren must vest, or fail, within the lives of a group that was
in being at A's death. See infra note 37.
33. See supra note 29. With respect to A's directions, he has not provided for
B's children because he anticipates that they will not survive the life tenants. If
they are eliminated completely because they will not, in all probability, be alive,
one might assume that A would have the same intention with respect to B's
grandchildren who do not survive the life tenants. Additionally, A has delayed
distribution of principal to B's grandchildren until they can enjoy and manage it.
Therefore, one might assume further that A would not want any share of principal
to belong to grandchildren unless they are able to enjoy it personally. And this
might translate into a requirement that they survive the ages designated for distri-
bution of the shares of principal.
pal can vest in a group who are not lives in being at the deaths of
a group who also are not lives in being, and because this can hap-
pen more than twenty-one years after the deaths of all who were
in being, the rule is violated. The maximum membership of the
class gift to grandchildren is determined within the common law
rule, but not the minimum and full (actual) membership. And
the common law rule requires that the class be fully determined
within the allowed period. Further, even without this particular
requirement that grandchildren must survive the life tenants, a
direction that grandchildren must actually attain age twenty-five,
thirty, or thirty-five violates the common law rule. And this would
be true even if one or more of B's grandchildren had already at-
tained age thirty-five by the time of A's death. In this situation,
the minimum class membership would be fixed immediately at
A's death at the number of grandchildren already age thirty-five,
while the maximum class membership would be determined
thereafter, at the latest, when B's children die. Because B is al-
ready dead and because his children become lives in being, both
points in time are clearly within the period of the common law
rule. However, the full membership might not be determined un-
til after the perpetuities period has elapsed. Once again, what re-
mote possibilities exist? While S's children are still alive, one of
B's children might have an additional child shortly before that
child of B dies. Because such grandchild is born before the time
for first distribution, he becomes eligible to join the class if he
thereafter satisfies the age requirements.3 4 All others who were
in being at A's death might also die before this grandchild's birth,
or shortly thereafter, so that the only people who continue to live
are S's afterborn children, B's afterborn grandchildren, and any
others born after A's death. Because it is possible, then, that
such afterborn grandchild may attain the required ages, and do so
more than twenty-one years after the deaths of all lives in being
34. Generally, a class gift is assumed to include all who might possibly join
the class. In this instance, it would include all of B's grandchildren whenever
born. However, if a conflict exists between the time for first distribution and the
time in which additional members become impossible, then the class is closed and
the maximum membership is determined when first distribution occurs. Accord-
ingly, because a grandchild of B has already attained the designated ages by the
time of A's death, first distribution must occur at the termination of the previous
life estates in S and her children. B's grandchildren born thereafter would be ex-
cluded. Somewhat differently, if none of B's grandchildren have satisfied the age
requirements by the time of A's death, then the class will close at the latest when
B's children all die. However, it may close before then at the time of first distribu-
tion. This would be when the life tenants die or when a grandchild attains age
twenty-five, whichever occurs last. For a discussion of the rules governing the de-
termination of maximum class membership, see L Simhs & A. SmxrH, supra note 7,
§§ 634-651.
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at A's death, there is a violation of the common law rule. More
specifically, because the afterborn grandchild may attain the re-
quired ages more than twenty-one years later-more than twenty-
one years after everyone in being at A's death has died, the
grandchild's interest may vest beyond the period of the common
law rule; therefore, the entire class gift must fail.
These particular perpetuities problems arise because of the sur-
vivorship requirements, but they can be avoided with some mod-
eration of A's objectives. For example, they can be rectified by
eliminating any requirement that B's grandchildren must survive
the life tenants and by making the age designations not a survi-
vorship requirement but a direction as to the time for actual dis-
tribution to either the grandchild himself or his estate.35 Or they
can be cured by imposing an outer time limit on these survivor-
ship requirements that is well within the common law rule, for
example, within twenty-one years of the later of the deaths of S,
S's children alive at A's death, B's children alive at A's death, or
B's grandchildren alive at A's death.36 Or, if these survivorship
requirements are retained, the common law rule can be avoided
by restricting the class of B's grandchildren to those alive at A's
death.37 In this instance, because all of the grandchildren become
35. This can be accomplished by a statement that clearly negates these survi-
vorship requirements and directs that principal must be given to the grandchil-
dren themselves or their successors in interest (including their estates) at the
appointed times for distribution. It may also be accomplished by language and
provisions that overcome the "divide-and-pay-over rule" and the survivorship im-
plications of a class gift subject to open or a gift "at" a specified age. See, e.g., L.
Sndss & A. SmIT, supra note 7, §§ 586, 588, 655-658. However, the latter techniques
are not entirely reliable because of the disparate results courts have sometimes
reached in these situations. Id.
36. For example, after setting out the survivorship requirements as to the life
tenants and the designated ages desired by A, the limitation might provide further
that the principal will vest fully in those grandchildren alive within twenty-one
years of the death of the last to die of the specified group if this event occurs
before the deaths of all of the life tenants or before each of the age requirements
is satisfied. Because the specified group consists exclusively of those in being at
A's death, and because they are reasonable in number and not unreasonably diffi-
cult to trace, the gift of principal to B's grandchildren satisfies the common law
rule. Further, because at least one of B's grandchildren or S's children alive at A's
death is likely to live to within twenty-one years of the life tenants' deaths and to
within twenty-one years of the last of B's grandchildren to attain age thirty-five,
this outer time limit is not likely to eliminate any of B's grandchildren, nor is it
likely to abridge the age requirements desired by A.
37. There would be no violation because the gift to grandchildren must vest, if
at all, within their respective lives and each is a life in being at A's death. Even
though possession and vesting may be deferred well beyond the deaths of other
lives in being, their interest must necessarily vest or fail within
the lives of those who are in being and, accordingly, their interest
is valid. Only the last of these choices affects the maximum class
membership and curbs A's desire to include all of B's grandchil-
dren. Once again, it should be apparent that without some rough
sketch or tentative provision for A's explicit dispositive. objec-
tives, followed by an interpretive application of the common law
rule, it is difficult to discern perpetuities violations and the pre-
cise reason for them. Consequently, without this prior step, it is
hazardous to take remedial action and, at the same time, expect
to create interests that comply with the common law rule and
achieve the estate owner's objectives.
CONCLUSION
This article stresses the importance of interpretive understand-
ing and application of the common law rule against perpetuities
when lawyers either construe or construct instruments disposing
of real property interests. In reply to this thesis, some lawyers
might contend that compliance with the common law rule has be-
come irrelevant in most creative planning situations. They might
argue that compliance is surely unnecessary in jurisdictions in
which the common law rule has been replaced with some form of
a "wait-and-see" rule.38 Further, they might add that it is even
unnecessary in jurisdictions where the common law rule obtains.
Saving clauses exist, and they have become commonplace in the
lives in being-such as S and her children alive at A's death, it is impossible for
the gift of principal to ever vest beyond the death of grandchildren, each of whom
is a life in being.
38. In the last several decades, the common law rule has been reformed in a
variety of ways that can be classified. Some of these reforms involve "patching-
up" specific problems that arise under the common law rule, while others give
courts a cy pres power to rectify violations of the rule consistent with the estate
owner's dispositive design. Other reforms have been more profound. Most promi-
nent among these reforms have been the various wait-and-see rules. These latter
reforms dispense with the common law rule's test of possibilities; validity is,
therefore, determined on the basis of actual events. In essence, they all derive
from a slight variation of Gray's summary of the common law rule "No interest
.... is valid unless it vests, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest." IL LYNN, supra note 6, at 203. Despite
this similarity among these wait-and-see rules, there are important differences
among them. Some are accompanied by a judicial power of cy pres, while others
are not. Some specify the lives in being by which the waiting period is measured,
while others do not. Further, some rules that specify these lives do so with statu-
tory lists of acceptable lives, while others do so with "causal lives" formulae. For a
discussion and classification of these reforms see J. DuKEMINIR & S. JOHANSON,
supra note 6, at 1051-76; R. LYNN, supra note 6, at 181-215; Note, supra note 16, at
586-89, 592-600. For a classification and illustration of these statutory reforms, see
R. MAUDsLEY, supra note 8, at 247-56.
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forms most lawyers use.3 9 These saving clauses successfully
avoid or rectify perpetuities violations. Compliance with the com-
mon law rule, therefore, may be deemed an unnecessary compli-
cation that only skews a dispositive scheme.
Why, then, should a planner bother with mastering the task of
complying with the common law rule? In the first place, a planner
cannot always guarantee that the wait-and-see test of his jurisdic-
tion will govern the interests created by the dispositive instru-
ments he drafts. A planner can control neither his client's place
of residence nor the situs of real property that comprises the cli-
ent's estate.4O In addition, both wait-and-see rules and saving
39. Nearly all forms for wills and trusts contain perpetuities saving clauses.
Several different kinds of clauses have been used over the last several decades.
Generally, these saving clauses redirect vesting or the distribution of the subject
matter after certain events have occurred. Accordingly, they can be distinguished
on the basis of the events involved and the methods for redirection.
Some saving clauses forbid vesting or the continuation of a trust beyond the pe-
riod permitted by law or beyond a life in being and twenty-one years, without
identifying such life. See, e.g., R. NEuHOFF, STANDARD CLAUSES FOR WUi.TS § 27.13
(3d ed. 1962); In re Lee's Estate, 49 Wash. 2d 254, 299 P.2d 1066 (1956). However,
most saving clauses are more specific and, therefore, do not present the risk of in-
validity because of uncertainty. These kinds of saving clauses vary. Some require
vesting within twenty-one years of the death of the survivor of named lives in be-
ing. See, e.g., W. SCHwARTz, FuTURE INTEREST AND ESTATE PLANNING § 6.32 (1965 &
Supp. 1972). Most clauses terminate trusts within twenty-one years of the death of
the survivor of designated beneficiaries who are lives in being. See, e.g., AKJ.
CAsNER, A PROPOSED ESTATE PLAN FOR MR. AND MRS. RicHARD iHARRY BLACK II
255-59 (1979); R. WYmIns, DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUST AGREEMENTS--A SYSTEMS
APPROACH §§ 15.20, 15.21, 15.20W, 15.21W (1980). Finally, other clauses redirect dis-
tribution or reform interests in the event of a perpetuities violation. Some do so
only in the event of an actual violation. See Leach, supra note 7, at 986. Others do
so when an interest is simply challenged under the common law rule or some as-
sociated rule. See Leach & Logan, Perpetuities: A Standard Saving Clause to
Avoid Violations of the Rule, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1141 (1961).
The methods for redirection also vary. Some are vague, for example, "to the per-
sons herein named who would be entitled to take distribution thereon upon termi-
nation of the trust." In re Lee's Estate, 49 Wash. 2d 254, 299 P.2d 1066, 1067-68
(1956). Others empowered either a court or a corporate fiduciary to reform the
provision or appoint the assets in a manner that most closely approximates the
estate owner's dispositive design and also satisfies the requirements of the rule.
See Leach, supra note 7, at 986; Leach & Logan, supra, at 1174. However, most
clauses are more specific. Some simply exclude those beneficiaries whose interest
does not vest within the required time period. See W. SCHWARTZ, supra, at § 6.32.
Finally, most saving clauses today redirect principal to beneficiaries then entitled
to income when the trust is actually terminated within twenty-one years after the
death of the survivor of designated lives in being. See F. Wnxms, supra, at
§§ 15.20, 15.21, 15.20W, 15.21W; L. SndEs & A. SMrrH, supra note 6, § 1295.
40. For a discussion of what perpetuities law governs, see AmRCAN LAW OF
PROPERTY supra note 13, § 24.5A.
clauses make critical actualities, not possibilities. Wait-and-see
rules accomplish this directly, while saving clauses achieve this
indirectly by setting an absolute time limit as to vesting, or to a
trust's duration, that falls within the common law rule.41 Both de-
lay ultimately dispositive determinations.42 If vesting or a failure
to vest, or sometimes the distribution and possession of principal
itself,43 does not actually occur within the permitted period of
time, then the interest either fails or remedial action is directed.44
41. Wait-and-see rules and most saving clauses are fundamentally similar.
Both set time periods beyond which interests cannot vest. The wait-and-see pe-
riod either is vaguely referable to a life in being and twenty-one years or is fixed
more specifically by a statutory list or formula. See supra note 38. The saving
clause period is determined by the clause itself, and the period formulated is one
that satisfies the common law rule. See supra note 39. Because wait-and-see rules
expressly allow for actualities and because saving clauses insure that no interest
can vest beyond the period of the common law rule, both legitimize a waiting pe-
riod during which it can be seen whether interests actually vest or fail. More spe-
cifically, saving clauses create delay to ascertain whether the subject matter
passes to those entitled to take if the interests vests within the specified period, to
those entitled to take if it fails to vest within the specified period, or to those who
take if it neither vests nor fails within the specified period.
Nevertheless, there are important differences between wait-and-see rules and
saving clauses. Saving clauses always expressly provide for those who are to take
if the interest neither vests nor fails within the designated time period that satis-
fies the common law rule. See id. Wait-and-see rules often allow for a cy pres ref-
ormation of interests that actually do not vest or fail within the allowed time
period, but sometimes they do not. The various statutes are discussed in the arti-
cles cited supra note 38. Furthermore, although the waiting periods under wait-
and-see rules and saving clauses both fall within a life in being and twenty-one
years, they are not usually the same waiting period. The waiting period allowed
by saving clauses is often more restrictive. Also, usually the waiting period is
clearly delineated under both, but sometimes it is not. Finally, wait-and-see rules
require that interests vest or fail within the allowed time period. Interests that ac-
tually vest within the period are valid and are preserved. Quite differently, most
saving clauses today do more than set a time limit to vesting. They terminate
trusts and distribute principal when this has not happened within the prescribed
time period. In short, they require that interests do more than vest within the
time period, they require distribution and ultimate possession of principal within
a time frame that satisfies the common law rule's requirements for vesting. See
supra notes 38 and 39.
42. Wait-and-see rules and saving clauses permit interests to vest or fail at
any time within the time period allowed by the rule or prescribed by the saving
clause. They create delay for a period of time to see what actually happens.
Therefore, they delay the dispositive determination to see whether the subject
matter will belong to those who take if the condition is fulfilled or belong to those
who take if it is breached. However, if the condition is neither breached nor ful-
filled within the time period allowed, these clauses and rules also delay the dis-
positive determination to see who should ultimately take pursuant to the direction
of the rule or the saving clause.
43. Under many saving clauses currently in use, trusts created within the in-
strument must terminate within a specified period of time. Stated differently, if
final distribution and possession of principal does not occur within twenty-one
years of the death of the survivor of specified lives in being, the trust is terminated
and principal is then distributed, usually to those currently entitled to income. See
supra notes 39 and 41.
44. Some wait-and-see statutes do not provide for remedial action. If the in-
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Therefore, both the wait-and-see rules and saving clauses invite
initial uncertainty.4 5 More importantly, they invite disputes, and
possibly litigation, as to when the permitted period has elapsed
46
terest actually neither vests nor fails within the permitted period of time, it vio-
lates the rule and is void. In the event of a violation, other wait-and-see statutes
give to the court a cy pres power to reform the limitation, within the limits of the
rule, in a manner that effectuates the estate owner's dispositive design. See supra
note 38.
Saving clauses, however, necessarily incorporate remedial action. By definition
a saving clause must save, and this cannot be accomplished without explicit provi-
sion for some remedial course of action. Accordingly, some clauses save by redi-
recting the time of vesting or distribution of principal, usually by giving principal
to those then entitled to income. (This latter technique may produce unintended
and undesirable dispositive consequences. See infra note 51.) Other clauses save
by empowering a corporate fiduciary or a court to reform the limitation, within the
limits of the common law rule, in a manner that effectuates the estate owner's dis-
positive design. See supra note 39.
45. The common law rule, wait-and-see rules, and saving clauses have in com-
mon these questions and, therefore, these uncertainties. Will the subject matter
belong to those who take if the condition is fulfilled, and, if so, when will this be
known? Will the subject matter belong to those who take if the condition is
breached, and, if so, when will this be known? Will the subject matter belong to
those who take if the interests presents a perpetuities violation and (sometimes),
if so, when will this be known? Finally, if a violation exists, specifically to whom
will the subject matter belong?
Even under the common law rule, if an interest is valid, there is a wait, and with
it uncertainty, to see whether the interest actually vests or fails. And this delay
may last for the full period of the common law rule. See R. MADmsLEY, supra note
8, at 82-84. Nevertheless, even though these rules and clauses always present the
foregoing questions, there are differences. Presumably, the common law rule re-
quires an immediate resolution of the last two questions. It can be determined,
without delay, whether a perpetuities violation exists and, if so, who is entitled to
take the subject matter. Wait-and-see rules, however, delay these determinations
until the end of the permitted waiting period. Only then will it be known whether
the subject matter belongs to those who take in the event of a violation, and spe-
cifically who should take if an interest actually neither vests nor fails in time. The
same conclusions can be reached with respect to most saving clauses that intro-
duce actualities and achieve wait-and-see indirectly. See supra notes 39 and 41,
and infra notes 46 and 47.
Accordingly, these rules and saving clauses all present the same substantive
questions and uncertainties. The common law rule, however, offers immediate
resolution of some of these questions, while the others do not.
46. There has been much debate as to how the period under a wait-and-see
test is, or should, be measured. Most of it concerns the uncertainty involved in
determining when the time for waiting has elapsed. More specifically, it concerns
the identity of the lives in being by which the waiting period can be determined.
See supra note 38. See also R. MAUDsLEY, supra note 8, at 87-109.
Many commentators maintain that, except for the statutes that include a statu-
tory list of measuring or waiting lives, the actual duration of the waiting period is
not always self-evident. Undoubtedly, most would agree that the waiting period is
uncertain when the statute is completely silent as to the selection of measuring
lives. To be sure, if there is uncertainty, there will be litigation.
The same can be said for some saving clauses as well. Most saving clauses used
and what curative action can and should be taken.47
The initial uncertainty and potential for disputes can be consid-
erably reduced by complying with the common law rule.48 Wait-
and-see rules are satisfied by interests that comply with the com-
mon law rule. Validity can be established at the outset, and in
most instances with ease and without substantially impairing dis-
positive objectives. 49 By eliminating the inherent delay of wait-
and-see rules and saving clauses, and the possible need for reme-
dial action that accompanies such delay, compliance with the
common law rule affords considerable clarity and secures disposi-
tive objectives. In short, the common law rule continues to be ex-
today clearly specify the lives which measure the period incorporated into the
clause; therefore, these provisons should not present this kind of problem. Never-
theless, this is not true for all saving clauses, particularly those that authorize ref-
ormation by a court or corporate fiduciary under the common law rule if an
interest is actually invalid or is challenged under the common law rule. See supra
note 39. In these instances, because the existence of a violation or a challenge
may be unclear, there may be litigation as to whether and when remedial action is
authorized.
47. If a wait-and-see statute does not include cy pres powers, presumably an
interest that does not actually vest or fail within the permitted waiting period vio-
lates the rule. And in this situation, there should be at least the same potential for
disputes and litigation, concerning the consequences of a violation, as under the
common law rule itself. The major difference is, of course, that such litigation
must be delayed until the end of the waiting period; only then can it be known
whether the interest actually violates the rule. For a discussion of the conse-
quences of a violation under the common law rule, see L, SImES & A. SmrrH, supra
note 7, §§ 1256-1264. If, however, a wait-and-see statute includes a cy pres power,
there should be disputes as to the substance of the reformation itself; more specif-
ically, there should be disputes as to what plan of disposition, that complies with
the rule, best approximates the original estate design. As long as a court has dis-
cretion, disputes would seem to be inevitable. This particular potential for litiga-
tion should also exist with respect to saving clauses that give the same curative
discretion to either a corporate fiduciary or a court. However, it should not arise
under saving clauses that afford remedial action by distributions to clearly identifi-
able beneficiaries.
48. Attempted compliance with the common law rule will diminish, but not
erase, these problems. If the rule is in fact satisfied, there should be no uncer-
tainty or disputes as to perpetuities violations. Nevertheless, actual compliance
with the common law rule may be open to dispute and uncertainty. It should be
noted, however, that this particular uncertainty can and should be resolved at the
outset. Assuming that the common law rule is satisfied and that no interest can
vest beyond the permitted time period, there is always a measure of uncertainty
as to whether these interests will actually vest or fail. In short, there is always a
measure of uncertainty as to whether the subject matter will belong to those who
take if the condition is fulfilled or belong to those who take if it is breached.
49. With careful planning and drafting, the common law rule should never
present any serious obstacle in effectuating an estate owner's dispositive design.
See, e.g., 6 AmRcA LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 13, § 24.13; L SiMEs & A. SMrrH,
supra note 7, §§ 1296-1297; Leach, supra note 6, at 669-71; Leach, Perpetuities in
Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HAnv. L. REv. 721, 723 (1952).
For illustrations of how the common law rule can be satisfied without substan-
tially impairing dispositive objectives, see supra notes 17, 18, 36 and accompanying
text.
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ceedingly important.50 Reliance upon wait-and-see rules and
saving clauses should not replace drafting that complies with the
common law rule; these wait-and-see rules and saving clauses
function best as safeguards, not as substitutes for careful drafting
that assures validity from the outset.5 ' Accordingly, the common
law rule must be understood, mastered, and satisfied by planners
everywhere.
50. Because the common law rule can be readily satisfied without jeopardizing
important dispositive objectives, some commentators maintain that planners
should continue to comply with the common law rule even in jurisdictions that
have changed the rule to a wait-and-see test. See, e.g., R. LYNN, supra note 6, at
151-52.
51. Some commentators recommend that saving clauses are either unneces-
sary or should be avoided if dispositive provisions are drafted in compliance with
the common law rule. See, e.g., L. SImEs & A. SuxrHn, supra note 7, § 1295; R. W-
Ems, supra note 39, §§ 15.20, 15.20W. There are at least two reasons for not includ-
ing these saving clauses, even as a precautionary safeguard against
miscalculation. First, these saving clauses can conceivably terminate a trust and
force a distribution of principal before the time appointed by a valid dispositive
provision. Typically, these saving clauses require that all trusts be terminated
within twenty-one years of the death of the survivor of all beneficiaries of the trust
alive when such interests were created. See supra note 39. However, depending
on the terms of the conditions, the dispositive provision may already be valid be-
cause vesting cannot occur beyond twenty-one years of a life in being who is not a
beneficiary. Accordingly, if the validating life in being-a non-beneficiary-lives
well beyond the deaths of beneficiaries identified in the saving clause, the trust
may be terminated unnecessarily. More specifically, if such a saving clause was
added to the illustration given earlier in the text beginning at page 746, B's chil-
dren would be excluded from the saving clause's measuring period even though
they might serve as validating lives in being under the terms of the dispositive
provision itself.
Second, these saving clauses usually provide that, when the trust is terminated
by the requirements of the clause itself, principal should be distributed to those
beneficiaries currently entitled to income. And this may effect a deviant distribu-
tion of principal by giving it to a group that was not ultimately intended to have
principal at all. Once again, with respect to the illustration given earlier in the
text, such a saving clause could prematurely terminate the trust and give principal
to S's children and not B's grandchildren. Assuming that all potential conditions
of survivorship were eliminated and that B's children became validating lives in
being, if S had afterborn children who lived more than twenty-one years beyond
the deaths of all beneficiaries alive at A's death, the trust would terminate and
give all of the principal to S's living children. And this would happen even though
B's grandchildren's remainder had vested under the rule many years earlier when
the last of B's children had died.
It should be noted that this potential for a deviant distribution of principal
arises not only because validating lives have been excluded from the measuring
period allowed by the saving clause, but also because such clause sets a time limit
to possession and not vesting. These kinds of saving clauses terminate trusts after
a period of time, and they do so even when all interests have vested previously
and also when all interests fully comply with the common law rule which focuses
on remoteness of vesting and not possession.
Mastery of the common law rule cannot be accomplished with-
out a firm grasp of the life in being concept. Once again, who is
the life in being by which one determines that an interest is
valid? The broad assertion that the validating life in being can be
that of anyone or those of any group of people is inadequate and
misleading. Indeed, the validating life in being cannot be that of
anyone unless as a part of the creative and drafting function, the
opportunity exists to make anyone's the validating life. This
broad assertion, then, constitutes a precept for planning only.
However, it is not enough even for the planner. Within the con-
text of the planning function this kind of discretion to designate
the validating life in being nearly always exists, but it may be
both unnecessary and inconsistent with an estate owner's under-
lying objectives to add just anyone as a validating life. Despite
the ultimate choice of lives that the creative planning process of-
fers, these choices should not be considered or exercised without
some prior elaboration of precise and full dispositive objectives
followed by interpretive application of the common law rule.
Mastery of the rule in practice cannot be accomplished without
both creative and interpretive skills. Ultimate and final creative
efforts demand interpretive facility with the common law rule.
The important question that remains is: If for interpretive pur-
poses the validating life in being cannot be just anyone, then who
is this life in being? Typically, explanations have been by exam-
ple, and have failed to distinguish carefully betwen lives used to
test and lives found to validate. These explanations assume that
eventually the validating life in being will evidence itself and a so-
lution will somehow materialize. Some students master the com-
mon law rule in this fashion, but most surrender in a state of
confusion. Something more is needed.5 2 Learning by experience
52. Because of a need to establish a viable measuring period under wait-and-
see reformations of the common law rule, much more has been said about the life
in being concept in recent years than in the past. See, e.g., Dukeminier, Kentucky
Perpetuities Law Restated and Reformed, 49 Ky. L.J. 3, 11-14 (1960); Morris and
Wade, supra note 16, at 495-501; Note, supra note 11, at 281-85; Fetters, Perpetuities:
The Wait-And-See Disaster-A Brief Reply to Professor Maudsley, With a Few
Asides to Professors Leach, Simes, Wade, Dr. Morris, et al., 60 CoRNELL I REV. 380,
390-94 (1975). These articles do not assume that the validating life in being auto-
matically selects itself for students struggling with the common law rule. Indeed,
they recognize that solutions can be reached and ought to be taught with a
method of analysis. Solutions by inspection are not enough. Nevertheless, these
articles may fall just short of the mark. Most student difficulties reflect a need to
find a group of lives by which the limitation can be tested in terms of the common
law rule. Those who understand the rule do not usually think in these terms; they
intuitively proceed to the relevant lives and then to a solution. The novice needs
direction for the purpose of trial and error testing, especially when a validating life
appears to be absent.
Fetters, for instance, is not clear enough as to which lives can be used to test the
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that culminates in solutions by intuition and simple inspection
will not suffice. Inevitably, the responsibility for something more
belongs to those who must teach the common law rule.
interests created. He focuses on the condition imposed and asks whether it might
happen more than twenty-one years after the deaths of all lives in being. He then
presupposes the unlikely deaths of everyone around, especially ancestors of those
who are given interests, after time enough for them to have another child. To be
sure, this approach is sound, because it comprehends everyone, it cannot overlook
potential validating lives. Nevertheless, students generally want more direction; in
a sense, they might view these broad suppositions, concerning all lives in being
and momentary turnovers in world population, as no direction at all.
Quite differently, the other commentaries are more specific; they focus on rele-
vant lives, those causally related to the condition. These are the only lives that
can possibly validate; therefore, these are the lives to be examined and tested and
a proof determined. Apart from definitional problems that concern causality (see
supra note 16), this method fails to recognize that although non-causal lives in be-
ing cannot possibly validate, they are invariably present and prominent in limita-
tions. This method likewise fails to recognize that students are never satisfied
with a finding of invalidity until these non-causal lives are tested. In short, it is
exceedingly important to recognize that a method of analysis must satisfy the stu-
dent's need to exclude as well as include possible validating lives. Students seem
more secure when they can exclude possible validating lives by actual testing; reli-
ance upon vague principles of causality often leaves them uneasy about their
conclusions.

